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New Media as Event
Abstract
The	Event is a philosophical concept coming out of the Continental tradition (Heidegger, 
Deleuze, Badiou, Žižek), useful for designating historical situation in which a multiplicity 
suddenly acquires a critical mass. After tracing the concept’s genealogy in the aforemen­
tioned thinkers, we argue that the term is useful for thinking about the variety of technolo­
gies and practices (desktop computers, tele­computation, smartphones, social media) that 
are now designated as “new media”. This designation, furthermore, allows us to understand 
and distinguish between meaningful critiques (political gestures such as those of Aaron 
Swartz), and those less meaningful (bit­torrenting and other forms of Internet piracy).
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Introduction
What	does	the	philosophical	concept	of	the	Event	have	to	tell	us	about	media	
studies,	 about	 film,	 about	 new	media,	 or	 about	 digital	 and	 networked	me-
dia?	Does	 a	 concept	 that	 describes	 haughty	 philosophical	 notions	 such	 as	
Heidegger’s	Gestell, or	world-historical	events1	like	the	French	Revolution,	
help	 us	 to	 understand	 electric	 typewriters,	 Internet	 packet	 protocols	 or	 the	
complicated	forms	of	determinism	that	cloud	our	thinking	about	the	same?	
Is	the	Internet	an	Event?	Did	the	coming	of	a	publicly	–	mass	–	accessible	
media	form,	one	that	facilitated	not	only	communication	but	cognitive	inter-
actions,	constitute	a	rupture	with	the	past,	a	new	era	making	possible	artistic	
expression,	new	social	relations,	political	organizing,	or	scientific	discoveries	
hitherto	difficult	or	impossible?	Is	nothing	the	same	after	social	media,	after	
ubiquitous	computing,	after	The	Internet	of	Things,	after	clouds	and	stacks,	
and	stacktivism?
In	this	paper	we	seek	to	bring	the	philosophy	of	the	Event	to	bear	on	media	
studies,	referencing	a	wide	range	of	material:	film,	the	novel,	electronic	tech-
nology,	networked	subjectivities.	Our	aim	here	is	both	to	describe	the	Internet	
as	the	Event	of	the	late	20th/early	21st	century,	and	to	focus	on	the	problems	
of	simplistic	dismissals	of	the	Internet,	as	co-opted	and	therefore	useless	from	
the	point	of	view	of	revolutionary	politics.	We	shall	entertain	precisely	these	
1
In	this	paper	we	follow	philosophical	conven-
tion,	capitalizing	the	“Event”	when	designat-
ing	 the	 concept,	 and	 using	 the	 lower-case	
“event”	 when	 describing	 a	 run-of-the-mill	
occurrence.
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questions	in	turn,	first	of	all	discussing	how	Slavoj	Žižek	has	developed	his	
theory	of	the	Event,	referencing	his	predecessors,	Martin	Heidegger	and	Alain	
Badiou	(but	also	Gilles	Deleuze),	but	especially	going	into	some	detail	with	
Žižek’s	theory,	developed	in	his	book	Event (2014),	of	the	Event	as	framing	
(enframing,	but	also	fantasy	as	frame),	and	what	this	has	to	tell	us	about	the	
“two	frames”	of	media:	the	real	and	the	virtual.	The	origins	of	Žižek’s	theory	
in	Heidegger’s	ideas	of	Gestell,	and	Badiou’s	theory	of	the	French	Revolu-
tion,	allow	us	to	think	historically	about	the	technological	revolution	that	is	
constituted	by	digital	computing.	It	is	our	argument	in	this	paper	that	now	is	
the	proper	moment	to	start	referring	to	the	concept	of	the	Event	with	respect	to	
new	media,	since	the	Lacanian	maxim	that	“truth	has	the	structure	of	fiction”	
can	be	read	as	a	definition	of	new	media	as	such	(Lacan	2002).	New	media	is	
seen	as	a	realistic	illusion,	what	the	Lacanians	call	the	semblant,	which	lacks	
any	referent	in	the	real	world (Miller	1990).	The	digital	sign,	for	example,	is	
acknowledged	as	post-photographic	since	it	is	disembodied,	and	it	no	longer	
guarantees	any	indexical	relation	between	the	referent	and	the	image.	Signifi-
ers	lose	any	stable	meaning	and	value	whether	they	are	visual	or	orthographic	
(Hansen	2004;	Virilio	1994).	Furthermore,	and	finally,	Žižek’s	theories	of	the	
gap	between	the	frames,	and	over-identification	as	critique,	provide	a	frame-
work	for	considering	recent	attempts	to	evade,	negate,	or	overturn	the	Event	
that	is	digital	hegemony.
The Event: Heidegger, Badiou, Žižek
The Event is	one	of	the	most	contested	–	but	also	“on	trend”	–	term	in	contem-
porary	thought	(Badiou	2000;	Badiou	2005;	Badiou	2007;	Bartlett,	Clemens	
2010;	Brown	 2004;	Deleuze	 1990;	Hallward	 2004;	 Johnston	 2009;	Norris	
2009;	Osborne	2013;	Žižek	1999;	Žižek	2007;	Žižek	2014a;	Žižek	2014b).	
In	modern	philosophy,	 the	 term	was	 initially	defined	by	Martin	Heidegger.	
Daniela	Vallega-Neu	remarks	of	Heidegger’s	term	Ereignis:
“…	scholars	(…)	translate	Ereignis not	only	as	‘event’	but	also	with	the	neologism	‘enowning’,	
or	as	‘appropriation’,	or	as	the	‘event	of	appropriation’.”	(Heidegger	1999,	Vallega-Neu	2010,	
Wheeler	2015)
Heidegger	sees	a	series	of	appropriating	events	as	Events	that	transform	dimen-
sions	of	human	sense-making	–	the	religious,	political,	philosophical	dimen-
sions	that	define	the	culturally	conditioned	epochs	of	human	history	(Wheeler	
2015).	An	Event	presents	a	twofold	process:	human	being	is	appropriated	by	
Being,	and	Being	needs	human	beings	to	disclose	itself	(Heidegger	1999:	6).	
Event	is	essential	swaying	of	Being	itself	(ibid.),	but	also	it	needs	Being	to	
put	Event	into	a	question	(ibid.:	7).	In	his	development	of	Ereignis,	Heidegger	
treats	 the	Event	 as	 something	 larger	 than	 a	moment	 in	 history:	Events	 are	
not	merely	cyclical	episodes.	An	Event	is	the	truth	of	existence	(Heidegger	
1962).	The	enowning	Event	is	truth	of	Being	(Heidegger	1999).	However,	it	
is	mostly	understood	as	history	–	Geschichte	(Heidegger	1999:	8)	–	where	it	
must	be	understood	much	wider,	as	“historical”	–	das Historische (ibid.)	–	a	
“question	of	all	questions”	(ibid.).	And	it	is	through	this	process	that	historical	
subjects	become	able	to	participate	in	historicity.	Since	the	enowning	Event	is	
the	truth	of	being,	Heidegger	insists	on	the	definition	of	the	Dasein as	some-
thing	that	is	enowned	in	enowning	(Heidegger	1999).	Heidegger	points	out	a	
conflict	between	history	as	an	academic	discipline,	and	his	understanding	of	
an	event:	history	is	more	than	the	simple	recounting	of	episodes	from	the	past.	
Rather,	Heidegger	implies	“a	departure	from	a	historiographic	and	objective	
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understanding	of	historical	events”,	moving	away	from	such	simplifications	
of	historiography	(Vallega-Neu	2003:	4).	And	it	is	especially	in	his	Contribu­
tions	 that	Heidegger	questions	 the	possibility	of	 redefining	history	 through	
the	notions	of	a	series	of	events	and	articulations	of	Being.	We	will	return	to	
Heidegger	momentarily,	and	to	his	concept	of	Gestell (perhaps,	Vallega-Neu	
argues,	a	preliminary	form	of	Ereignis),	but	we	must	allow	that	concept	 to	
emerge	at	its	proper	place,	in	Žižek’s	discussion	of	the	Event	in	his	book	of	
the	same	name	(Žižek	2014b).
In	Event Žižek	offers	 a	 polysemic	heterogeneity	of	 the	 term	 (we	will	 deal	
with	the	intervening	philosopher	Badiou	below).	What	does	it	mean	to	treat	
something	as	an	Event?	Žižek	offers:
“Event	is	not	something	that	occurs	within	the	world,	but	is	a	change	of	the	very	frame	through	
which	we	perceive	the	world	and	engage	in	it.”	(Žižek	2014b)2
Such	 evental	 framing,	 Žižek	 argues,	 can	 sometimes	 be	 directly	 present	 as	
a	 fiction	which	 nonetheless	 enables	 us	 to	 tell	 the	 truth	 in	 an	 indirect	way.	
Here	Žižek	is	following	French	philosopher	Alain	Badiou	who,	at	some	ex-
tent,	elaborates	against	Heidegger’s	notion	of	history,	and	defines	an	Event	
on	the	basis	of	specific	historical	events,	such	as	the	French	Revolution,	while	
stressing,	as	does	Žižek,	the	fictional,	narrative	nature	of	an	event.	Neverthe-
less,	the	fictional	character	of	an	Event	is	not	its	limitation	but	on	the	contrary	
–	its	necessity.	In	Being and the Event,	Badiou	proposes	a	tautology	that	es-
tablishes	precisely	this	imperative.	To	verify	whether	an	Event	is	presented	
in	 a	 situation,	Badiou	 says	 that	 it	 is	 first	 necessary	 to	 verify	whether	 it	 is	
presented	as	an	element	of	itself,	of	itself	qua set	(Badiou	2005:	15).	Badiou	
argues	that	to	ask	whether	the	French	Revolution	is	really	an	Event	in	French	
history,	we	must	first	establish	that	it	is	definitely	a	term	immanent	to	itself.	
Thus,	he	elaborates	that	the	event	‘The	French	Revolution’	forms	a	one	out	
of	everything	which	makes	up	its	site;	that	is,	France	between	1789	and,	let’s	
say,	1794	(Badiou	2005:	180).	That	site	is	filled	with	heterogeneous	happen-
ings.	If	historians	try	to	describe	the	Event	accurately	or	thoroughly	as	it	was	
at	the	time	of	its	happening,	they	can	end	up	with	a	“forever	infinite	number-
ing	of	the	gestures,	things	and	words	that	co-existed	with	it”	(Badiou	2005:	
180).	However,	the	French	Revolution	is	an	Event	because	it	“both	presents	
the	infinite	multiple	of	the	sequence	of	facts	situated	between	1789	and	1794,	
and,	moreover,	it	presents	itself	as	an	immanent	résumé	and	one-mark	of	its	
own	multiple”	(Badiou	2005:	180).	The	site	coheres	or	coalesces	around	itself	
as	Event.	Moreover,	an	Event	is	always	presented	in	a	situation	as	the	arrival	
in	being	of	non-being,	the	arrival	amidst	the	visible	of	the	invisible.	For	the	
Event	–	and	Žižek	goes	into	some	detail	in	this	regard	in	The Ticklish Subject 
– raises	 the	problem	of	 the	subject,	of	being	 infidelity	 to	 the	Event	 (Žižek	
1999).	In	other	words,	to	treat	an	Event	as	an	element	of	itself	it	has	to	be	live	
(discursively)	not	because	of	its	historical	truthfulness,	its	greatness	from	a	
point	of	view	of	history.	Such	understanding,	as	we	know,	is	usually	unclear	
in	the	exact	moment	of	the	Event,	which	demands	that	history	be	rewritten	or	
begun	anew.	It	is	almost	the	opposite	–	to	treat	an	Event	as	an	element	of	itself	
means	that	an Event is an Event because it is disputed	in	its	elements	but	still	
not	in	its	whole,	as	if	an	Event	itself	knows	that	it	is	an	Event.	This	is	the	sense	
in	which	Deleuze	talks	about	the	Event,	as	a	plague	or	war	or	wound	that	re-
2
The	very	lack	of	a	definitive	pronoun	in	Eng-
lish,	an	“a”	or	“the”,	at	times	reflects	the	phi-
losopher’s	desire	 to	 impart	a	weighty	gravi­
tas.
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organizes	 itself,	 during	 the	 “present	moment	of	 its	 actualization”	 (Deleuze	
1990).	And	this	is	just	to	stress	that	Badiou’s	event	is	germane	to	new	media,	
which	presents	the	multiple,	from	the	development	of	the	desktop	computer	in	
the	late	1970s	to	the	Internet	coalescing	in	the	1990s,	social	media	in	the	first	
decade	of	this	century,	and	smartphones	shortly	after.
Now	we	can	address	Badiouian	notion	of	an	event,	and	return	to	Heideggerian	
notion	of	the	Event.	For	the	specificity	of	the	Event	is	an	existence,	and	at	
the	same	time	the	non-existence	of	an	Event	in	the	moment	of	its	happening	
(which	is	the	Badiouian	lesson).	The	specificity	of	new	media	lies	precisely	in	
that	tautology.	It	is	not	at	all	obvious	whether	and	to	which	extent	literacy	and	
knowledge	in	the	media	age	have	changed.	However,	one	could	say	that	the	
new	media	as	an	Event	is	a	one-multiple	made	up	of	all	the	multiples	which	
belong	 to	 its	 site	 (all	 possible	 technical	 tools,	 from	 hardware	 to	 software,	
from	users’	affect	to	workers’	virtual	exploitation),	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	
Event	itself	which	is	an	almost	eschatological	fiction	of	itself,	the	harbinger	
of	a	new	era.	This	dramatic	entrance	of	new	media	is	not	only	technical	(the	
digitally	produced	sign,	popular	media	frenzies),	but	also	dramatic	in	its	fic-
tional	nature	–	as	with	Virtual	Reality	(VR).	It	is	not	clear	what	virtual	reality	
exactly	means,	but	at	the	same	time	it	is	clear	that	VR	dramatically	changes	
our	notion	of	space	and	time.	VR	is	much	more	than	its	technical	definitions.	
That	is,	in	a	pure	technical	sense,	VR	refers	to	such	technologies	as	the	Cave	
and	HMD,	or	head-mounted	displays,	technological	innovations	that	are	still	
in	the	“goofy”,	prototype	stage.	However,	VR	is	rarely	used	in	that	“strong”	
sense,	but	rather	in	the	“weak”	sense	–	virtual	reality	understood	merely	as	
a	 realistic	 illusion	 (Lévy	2001).	And	 this	 is	 exactly	 the	 reason	why	Virilio	
describes	the	fictional	and	immersive	character	of	digital	media	that	engages	
subjects	as	the	“narco-economy	of	computer	communication”	(Virilio	1995).	
But	 if	we	apply	Badiou’s	Event	 to	new	media,	we	are	 reminded	 that	 such	
media	exist	precisely	despite	(and	not	because)	of	all	the	multiples	which	be-
long	to	its	site.	Whereas	Lévy	offers	a	techno-utopian	take	on	new	media,	and	
Virilio	a	pessimistic	antagonism,	the	evental	nature	of	the	Event	is	not due	to	
its	particular	occurrences,	but	(and	we	are	following	Badiou	here)	a	reflection	
of	the	retroactive	intervention	of	our	own	filters.
The	interpretive	chasm	that	separates	Lévy	and	Virilio	is	in	turn	reflected	in	
the	empirical	multiples	enumerated	by	Badiou	when	he	lists	some	of	the	fea-
tures	of	the	(evental)	site	of	the	French	Revolution:
“…	the	great	electors	of	the	General	Estates,	the	peasants	of	the	Great	Fear,	the	sans-culottes	of	
the	towns,	the	members	of	the	Convention,	the	Jacobin	clubs,	the	soldiers	of	the	draft,	but	also,	
the	price	of	subsistences,	the	guillotine,	the	effects	of	the	tribunal,	the	massacres,	the	English	
spies,	the	Vendans,	the	assignats (banknotes),	the	theatre,	the	Marseillaises,	etc.”	(Badiou	2005:	
180)
And	can	we	not	compare	this	list	to	today’s	site	of	new	media	that	includes	the	
digital	devices,	the	smart	phones	and	tablets,	and	laptops,	and	Google	glasses,	
and	Oculus	Rift,	but	also	their	touchscreens	and	Bluetooth	connections,	and	
styluses	and	cases,	and	power	cords	and	batteries,	the	Wi-Fi	routers	and	the	
Internet	 cables	 and	 server	 farms,	 and	 the	programs	and	apps,	 and	 storages	
and	 interfaces,	and	 the	workers	at	Foxconn,	or	workers	digging	 for	metals	
in	the	Congo	and	serving	us	at	Apple	stores,	help-lines,	or	as	feed	scrubbers,	
and	“like	farmers”	(Chen	2014,	Emerson	2014).	Our	aim,	of	course,	is	not	to	
undermine	 the	historical	gravity	of	 the	French	Revolution	by	comparing	 it	
to	simple	(or	not-so-simple)	tools	and	devices.	However,	the	moment	when	
banality	enters	and	takes	over	contemporary	understandings	of	our	tools,	our	
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historicizing	of	this	highly	technological	present,	an	ontological	comprehen-
sion	of	the	Event	is	all	the	more	crucial.	We	have	to,	then,	reverse	the	domi-
nant	simplification	and	banality	of	narcissistic,	individualistic	approaches	to	
technology	and	instead	insist	on	the	evental	status	of	the	informational/new	
media/post-industrial	society.
This	is	to	argue	that	to	treat	new	media	as	an	Event	does	not	mean	to	define	
or	categorize	new	media	in	a	homogenizing	fashion,	especially	since	the	new	
media	 paradigm	 shift	 can	 be	 approached	 to	 as	 either	 a	 change	 in	material	
media	or	 as	 a	more	profound	 redefinition	of	 the	production	 and	 reproduc-
tion	of	social	life.	But	we	must	indeed	make	a	strong	and	verifiable	claim	as	
to	whether	new	media	is	an	Event.	In	a	way,	by	taking	up	the	discussion	of	
Badiou	and	tautology	from	above,	new	media	has	to	recognize	itself	as	the	
Event.	This	means	without	any	a priori	interventions,	without	the	help	of	any	
positive	 or	 negative	 interpretations,	 either	 techno-futurist	 or	 techno-escha-
tologist	notions.	Here	the	true	question	is	not	the	question	about	the	impact 
of	media	(the	banal	questions	one	entertains	from	reporters:	does	new	media	
change	our	historical	horizons,	our	way	of	 thinking,	reading,	writing,	etc.),	
but	instead	a	question	of	how	or	whether	new	media	does	all	of	these	things	
despite	any	specific	interpretation	of	that	doing.	That	is,	to	speak	of	the	Event	
of	new	media	is	to	assert	the	unconscious	of	new	media.
Being	based	on	specific	events	and	at	the	same	time	impossible	to	provide	any	
proof	for	the	Event,	Badiouian	event	is	defined	against	Heideggerian	concept.	
Although	serious	predicates	can	be	identified,	those	are	all	only	effects	of	the	
way	in	which	an	event	functions.	New	media	precisely	shows	how	Heidegge-
rian	event	(banished	from	the	common	epistemological	discussions	on	tech-
nology)	can	be	fruitful	for	the	exegesis.	New	media	event	functions	both	as	
Badiouian	event	as	an	element	of	itself,	related	to	a	specific	moment	in	his-
tory,	and	as	Ereignis	–	appropriated	event,	larger	than	a	moment	in	history,	
an	Event	as	truth	of	existence.	What	Heidegger’s	work	does,	and	other	exist-
ing	concepts	do	not,	is	that	Heidegger	insists	on	the	larger	framing	(enfram-
ing),	historicity	and	not	history,	technological	(technical)	and	not	technology	
(technique).	It	is	the	reason	why	Žižek	employs	the	notion	of	the	Gestell	to	
describes	the	ways	in	which	new	media	is	framed.
The Event and the frame
Žižek’s	Event was	 published	 as	 part	 of	 Penguin	 books	 series	 “philosophy	
in	transit”,	which	feature	Wolfgang	Tillman’s	photographs	of	London	Tube	
commuters	on	the	cover.	And	Žižek	plays	along	gamely	in	the	structure	of	his	
book	(with	various	chapters	as	subway	or	train	stations),	with	even	an	open-
ing	cultural	example	taken	from	another	kind	of	train,	Agatha	Christie’s	1957	
novel	4:50 from Paddington. Žižek	writes:
“Elspeth	McGillicuddy,	on	 the	way	 to	visit	her	old	friend	Jane	Marple,	sees	a	woman	being	
strangled	in	the	compartment	of	a	passing	train	(…).	It	all	happens	very	fast	and	her	vision	is	
blurred,	so	the	police	don’t	take	Elspeth’s	report	seriously	as	there	is	no	evidence	of	wrongdo-
ing;	only	Miss	Marple	believes	her	story	and	starts	to	investigate.	This	is	an	event	at	its	purest	
and	most	minimal:	something	shocking,	out	of	joint,	that	appears	to	happen	all	of	a	sudden	and	
interrupts	the	usual	flow	of	things;	something	that	emerges	seemingly	out	of	nowhere,	without	
discernible	causes,	an	appearance	without	solid	being	as	its	foundation.”	(Žižek	2014a)
Now,	 the	 incident	Žižek	 is	 referring	 to	bears	 its	own	examination,	 for	pur-
poses	that	will	soon	become	clear.	This	is	Christie’s	text:
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“[McGillicuddy’s]	train	gathered	speed	again.	At	that	moment,	another	train,	also	on	a	down-
line,	swerved	towards	them,	for	a	moment	with	almost	alarming	effect.	For	a	time,	the	two	trains	
ran	parallel,	 now	one	gaining	 a	 little,	 now	 the	other.	Mrs.	McGillicuddy	 looked	down	 from	
her	window	through	the	windows	of	the	parallel	carriages.	Most	of	the	blinds	were	down,	but	
occasionally	the	occupants	of	the	carriages	were	visible.	The	other	train	was	not	very	full	and	
there	were	many	empty	carriages.	At	the	moment	when	the	two	trains	gave	the	illusion	of	being	
stationary,	a	blind	in	one	of	the	carriages	flew	up	with	a	snap.	Mrs.	McGillicuddy	looked	into	
the	lighted	first-class	carriage	which	was	only	a	few	feet	away.	Then	she	drew	her	breath	in	with	
a	gasp	and	half-rose	to	her	feet.	Standing	with	his	back	to	the	window	and	to	her	was	a	man.	
His	hands	were	around	the	throat	of	a	woman	who	faced	him,	and	he	was	slowly,	remorselessly,	
strangling	her.”	(Christie	2011)
Mrs. McGillicuddy looked down from her window through the windows of 
the parallel carriages.	This	is	an	example,	then,	not	only	of	an	Event	in	all	its	
raw,	unanticipated	rupture	in	the	everyday	(already	prepared	for	us,	and	for	
Mrs.	McGillicuddy,	by	the	illusion	of	stasis	between	the	two	trains),	but	of	
that	Event	arriving	with	a	frame,	indeed	with	the	doubled framing of	the	two	
train	windows.
Consider,	too,	a	scene	in	The Karate Kid where	the	young	hero	(Daniel,	played	
by	Ralph	Macchio)	is	having	a	meal	with	his	mother	in	a	restaurant.	Behind	
them	is	the	restaurant	window,	and	out	that	window	(in	a	kind	of	reversal	of	
Edward	Hopper’s	famous	painting	Nighthawks from	1942)	we	see	the	hero’s	
enemies	leaving	a	karate	studio	across	the	street.	Here	we	have	framed,	within	
the	 cinematic	 shot,	 the	 family	 unit	 (mother	 and	 son),	 and	 then	 framed,	 by	
the	window	behind	 them,	what	 threatens	 that	unit.	This	 cinematic	 framing	
(through	an	arguably	Wellesian	“deep	 focus”)	 is	 again	a	kind	of	doubling.	
And,	these	frames	then	are	the	frame	that,	as	Žižek	argues	in	Event,	“regulate	
our	access	to	reality”	(Žižek	2014a:	30).	That	is,	framing	itself	constitutes	an	
Event.	What	does	this	mean?	And	what	do	these	essential	visual	and	literary-
cinematic	frames	have	to	do	with	the	Internet?
In	his	discussion	of	the	Event	as	“framing,	reframing,	enframing”, Žižek	ar-
gues	that	philosophy	deals	with	“the	transcendental	horizon,	or	frame,	of	our	
experience	of	reality”	(2014a:	10).	Žižek	expands	on	Badiou’s	notion	of	the	
fictitious	character	of	the	Event,	and	defines	an	Event	as	the	frame	through	
which	we	see	the	world	(and	which	guides	us	in	our	actions	in	the	world)	–	or	
the	Event	is	a	change	in	that	frame,	an	enframing,	a	reframing,	even	a	dissolu-
tion	of	a	frame.	As	with	Badiou’s	multiple	and	the	one,	and	how	that	“truth	
with	the	structure	of	a	fiction”	applies	to	networked	media,	we	can	see	that	
the	frame	then	can	be	a	way	of	thinking	about	new	media.	This	is	so	because	
frames	 also	 have	 a	 psychoanalytic	 name: fantasy.	We	 need	 fantasies	 –	 or	
frames	–	to	sustain	our	relationships,	for	example,	because,	as	Lacan	famous-
ly	said,	“there	is	no	sexual	relationship”	in	the	sense	that	there	is	no	dominant	
narrative	or	frame	to	which	one	can	reliably	turn	to	help	one’s	marriage	or	
coupledom	cohere	(Lacan	1999).	Of	course,	Žižek	and	Lacan	have	much	to	
say	about	the	role	of	fantasy,	most	notably,	fantasy	“teaches	us	how	to	desire”	
(Žižek	2014a).	And	it	is	in	this	context	that	Žižek	turns	to	Heidegger:
“Gestell, Heidegger’s	word	 for	 the	 essence	 of	 technology,	 is	 usually	 translated	 into	English	
as	‘Enframing’.	At	its	most	radical,	technology	does	not	designate	a	complex	network	of	ma-
chines	and	activities,	but	the	attitude towards reality which	we	assume	when	we	are	engaged	in	
such	activities:	technology	is	the	way	reality	discloses	itself	to	us	in	contemporary	times.	The	
paradox	of	technology	as	the	concluding	moment	of	Western	metaphysics	is	that	it	is	a	mode	
of	enframing	which	poses	a	danger	to	enframing	itself:	the	human	being	reduced	to	an	object	
of	technological	manipulation	is	no	longer	properly	human;	it	loses	the	very	feature	of	being	
ecstatically	open	to	reality.	However,	this	danger	also	contains	the	moment	for	salvation:	the	
moment	we	become	aware	and	fully	assume	the	fact	that	technology	itself	is,	in	its	essence,	a	
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
63	(1/2017)	pp.	(139–153)
C.	Burnham,	K.	Peović	Vuković,	New	Me-
dia	as	Event145
mode	of	enframing,	we	overcome	 it	–	 this	 is	Heidegger’s	version	of	 traversing	 the	 fantasy.”	
(Žižek	2014a:	94)
Thus,	in	Žižek’s	reading	of	Heidegger,	technology	is	a	kind	of	Heideggerian	
enframing,	a	Gestell that	also	stands	for	a	“fundamental	fantasy”	that	struc-
tures	our	reality,	that	teaches	us	what	to	desire.	Žižek’s	notion	of	history	is	
a	Heideggerian	notion	of	history,	“belonging	to	the	essence	of	technology”	
(Heidegger	2013)	that	relates	technology	to	the	Event.
But	if	this	is	a	correct	reading,	then	what	is	the	relationship	between	the	terms	
or	concepts	of	frame,	Event,	fantasy,	and	desire?	What	is	notable	about	the	
Event	–	what	is,	in	Badiou’s	translators’	awkward	neologism,	“evental”	–	is	
not	simply	its	happening,	but	what	 the	Event	does	to	our	perception	of	 the	
world,	of	how	the	world	is	framed.	“Everything	is	different”,	“this	changes	
everything”	–	such	phrases	indicate,	in	a	fumbling	way,	not	that	the	world	qua 
world	(the	noumenal,	in	Kantian	parlance)	has	changed,	but	that	the	phenom­
enon of	the	world	has	changed.	Žižek	rewrites	Heidegger	in	a	way	that	allows	
us	to	apply	his	understanding	of	an	Event	to	contemporary	technology.	Why	is	
this	so?	He	insists	on	a	certain	fictional,	unconscious	status	of	the	evental.	In	
Heidegger’s	unconcealedness	of	the	truth	(aletheia),	there	is	a	difference	be-
tween	ontical	and	ontological	(similar	to	Kant’s	noumenon and	phenomenon).	
But	Žižek	inserts	the	Lacanian	interpretation	of	the	“ontological	difference”	
as	a	“rift	in	the	ontic	order”,	which	is	parallel	to	the	Badiouian	admission	that	
the	Event	is	ultimately	nothing	more	than	a	“symptomal	torsion”	in	the	order	
of	Being,	a	matter	of	inconsistency,	the	return	of	the	repressed,	or	even	the	
objet petit a (Bartlett	2010;	Johnston	2009;	Žižek	1999).	Why	this	twist	of	
the	constitutive	nature	of	the	(Hegelian)	negation?	The	things	that	we	cannot	
be	aware	of	constitute	a	possibility	of	the	truth	(which	is	why	we	cannot	be	
sure	of	something	that	we	know).	As	Badiou	has	argued	in	his	Theory of the 
Subject,	this	constitutes	an	appropriation	of	the	classic	Lacanian	subversion	
of	the	subject	(Badiou	2009).
What	is	crucial	to	our	argument	is	how	this	“double”	enframing	functions	in	a	
similar	way	with	respect	to	digital	devices,	interfaces,	and	social	media.	That	
is,	there	is	always	a	framing	that	is	simultaneously	the	thing	or	the	object	(the	
stuff	that	is	the	phone	or	tablet	or	laptop,	etc.)	and	the	virtual	(images,	code,	
the	visual).	Take	the	example	of	a	rather	ordinary,	old-ish,	iPhone	4,	which	
one	of	this	paper’s	authors	has	owned	for	a	few	years	now.	When	I	want	to,	
say,	go	onto	social	media	network	called	Facebook,	firstly	I	must	push	the	
small	button	at	the	bottom	of	the	phone.	Then	I	swipe	the	unlock	slide,	enter	
in	my	phone’s	passcode,	and	am	confronted	with	a	few	screens	worth	of	apps	
(icons	 for	apps).	 I	press	on	 the	Facebook’s	“f”	 logo,	 then	 the	status	button	
(which	is	itself	an	icon	of	a	pen	on	a	slant	in	a	box,	as	if	writing	paper).	Or,	if	
I	just	want	to	read	my	friends’	status	updates,	I	start	scrolling	through,	phone	
in	my	left	hand,	thumb	moving	from	bottom	to	top	of	the	screen.	The	phone	
itself	constitutes	the	first	frame.	It	is	a	physical	frame	–	the	Internet	is	a	thing,	
an	object	(Blum	2012).	What	is	“in”	or	“on”	the	screen	–	icons,	boxes,	im-
ages	–	then	is	the	second	frame.	This	second	frame	may	be	multiple	(frames	
within	frames)	but	their	virtuality/visuality	makes	them	a	One,	one	frame,	in	
counter-distinction	to	the	other	One	frame,	that	of	the	device.
What	is	revolutionary	in	such	framing,	one	may	ask?	Is	it	not,	first	of	all,	a	
betrayal	of	the	initial	Event	of	media,	a	withdrawal	of	the	original	idea	of	uni-
versal	connectivity,	and	its	subversion	via	tactical	media?	We	could	be	–	and	
this	 is	a	difficult	admission	to	make	–	viewing	this	new	media	as	Event	 in	
the	same	disastrous	way	in	which	Heidegger	did	when	he	sought	out	Nazism	
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as	an	Event	 (Marty	2015,	Žižek	2008).	The	very	philosopher	who	focused	
his	interest	on	the	enigma	of	ontological	difference	fell	into	the	same	trap	of	
conferring	 upon	Nazism	 an	 ontological	 dignity	 (Žižek	 1999;	 Žižek	 2014).	
What	if	the	Event	is	a	failed	Event,	a	betrayal	of	the	Event	(Not	in	Badiouian	
understanding	of	betrayed	truth	process)?	If	there	is	something	evental	in	new	
media	technology	that	has	to	do	with	the	future	as	“having-been/gesewene”,	
as	future	that	is	located	in	the	past?	The	actual	evental	status	of	new	media	lies	
in	its	repetition/retrieval	of	its	past,	not	“of	the	past	as	it	was”,	but	of	“that	in	
the	past	which	the	past	itself,	in	its	reality,	betrayed,	stifled,	failed	to	realize”	
(Žižek	2008:	141).	To	paraphrase	Žižek,	to	treat	the	new	media	as	an	Event	
means	 to	bring	out	 the	non-realized	potentials	of	 its	 past:	 data	 retrieval	 as	
Freudian	“compulsion	to	repeat”.	Are	we	in	danger,	as	is	Žižek,	of	detecting	
in	Nazism	moments	that	need	to	be	realized?	This,	of	course,	is	also	Fredric	
Jameson’s	argument	with	respect	to	the	Utopian	dimension	of	all	ideologies	
(Jameson	 1971).	Or:	what	 new	media	 constitutes	 as	 an	 Event	 is	 precisely	
such	a	Utopian	moment	that	is	lacking	in	Nazism,	a	Utopian	opening	present	
to	 those	moments	described	by	Badiou	 and	Žižek:	 since	 the	 “difference	 is	
strictly	immanent	to	enthusiastic	unity”	(Žižek	2008:	116).	Which	is	to	say,	
that	if	new	media	is	an	Event,	this	is	so	because	its	common	denominator	is	
the	Rancièreian	“part	of	no-part”	that	functions	as	a	“universal	singularity”	
embodying	the	universal	dimension:	not	so	much	a	commercialized	version	
of	Internet	or	digital	connectivity	(which	would	be	the	failed	Event,	the	dis-
aster),	which	we	avoid	via	the	very	embracing	of	that	failure	(try	again,	fail	
again):	to	arrive	at	the	ontological	truth	of	the	Event,	one	has	to	err	ontically	
(Žižek	1999,	Žižek	2007).
Hiding Heidegger between the frames
The	digital,	the	Internet,	is	an	evental	frame	in	the	spatial	manner	that	changes	
our	relation	to	the	world.	And	so	we	sit	on	trains	or	park	benches	hunched	
over	our	devices.	Does	this	isolate	us,	remove	us	from	our	surrounds?	Surely	
–	although	whether	it	does	so	any	more	than	if	we	are	reading	a	newspaper	
or	a	novel,	we	are	not	certain	(even	this	scene	that	we	use	to	describe	fram-
ing	is	itself	framed).	What	may	help	us	here	is	to	continue	to	read	Žižek	on	
the	question	of	frames,	and	doubled	frames	in	particular.	In	his	book	on	the	
Polish	filmmaker	Krzysztof	Kieślowski,	a	slim	volume	called	The Fright of 
Real Tears, Žižek	describes	an	impromptu	theory	of	the	“two	frames”	that	he	
came	up	with	at	“an	art	round	table”:
“The	frame	of	the	painting	in	front	of	us	is	not	its	true	frame;	there	is	another,	invisible	frame,	
implied	by	the	structure	of	the	painting,	which	frames	our	perception	of	the	painting,	and	these	
two	frames	do	not	overlap	–	there	is	an	invisible	gap	separating	the	two.”	(Žižek	2001:	5–6)
Then	Žižek,	after	discussing	 this	concept	 further,	declares	 that	he	was	dis-
mayed	that	his	“total	bluff”	of	an	idea	was	then	taken	up	by	the	other	partici-
pants	in	the	round	table	(whom	he	is	polite	enough	not	to	mention),	but	of	
course	this	incident	is	nothing	more	than	the	embarrassment	we	all	feel,	as	
intellectuals,	when	we	are	riff	on	an	idea	and	then	witness	its	success.	Indeed,	
Žižek,	toward	the	end	of	The Fright of Real Tears,	returns	to	this	idea,	adding	
that	“[t]he	pivotal	content	of	the	painting	is	not	rendered	in	its	visible	part,	
but	is	located	in	this	dislocation	of	the	two	frames,	in	the	gap	that	separates	
them”	(Žižek	2001:	5–6),	connecting	painting	with	film	(he	mentions	Edward	
Hopper’s	art,	“where	it	seems	as	if	 the	picture’s	frame	has	to	be	redoubled	
with	a	window-frame”).
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Matthew	 Filsfeder,	 in	 his	 book	 on	The Symbolic, the Sublime, and Slavoj 
Žižek’s Theory of Film,	remarks	that	we	should	take	Žižek’s	second	iteration	
of	the	theory	seriously,	arguing	that	Žižek	merely	maintains	a	“cynic’s	dis-
tance”	from	the	first	as	a	form	of	“ideological	belief”	(Flisfeder	2013).	And	
as	if	to	continue	the	(Maoist?)	self-critique,	Žižek	makes	a	similar	argument	
in	Less than Nothing:
“My	procedure	here	perfectly	illustrated	the	point	I	was	(and	am)	repeatedly	trying	to	make	ap-
ropos	of	today’s	predominant	attitude	of	cynicism	and	not-taking-oneself-seriously.	Even	when	
a	subject	mocks	a	certain	belief,	this	in	no	way	undermines	the	belief’s	symbolic	efficacy	–	the	
belief	often	continues	to	determine	the	subject’s	activity.”	(Žižek	2012:	87)
Flisfeder	makes	 another	 point	with	 respect	 to	Žižek’s	 two	 frames,	 arguing	
that
“…	the	two	frames,	the	visible	and	the	invisible,	represent	the	relation	between	the	Symbolic	
and	the	Imaginary	in	Lacanian	psychoanalysis	–	that	is,	between	the	apparent	content	and	the	
obscene	supplemental	underside,	and	the	gap	between	them	is	the	Real,	or	the	place	of	the	sub-
ject.”	(Flisfeder	2013:	102)
These	discussions	of	 frames	and	doubled	frames	digital	can	help	us	 in	our	
question	of	the	Event	of	the	Internet	–	or	even	to	ask:	is	new	media	an	Event?	
To	think	of	the	Internet	or	new	media	as	an	Event	means,	first	of	all,	to	argue	
that	our	digital	interfaces	frame	our	understanding	of	the	world.	Which	seems	
fairly	uncontroversial	as	a	thesis.	And,	then,	it	is	to	argue	that,	as	Žižek	puts	
it	in	The Parallax View	where,	three	years	after	The Fright of Real Tears,	he	
expands	on	the	notion	of	the	frames,	the	“frame	is	always-already	redoubled:	
the	 frame	within	 ‘reality’	 is	always	 linked	 to	another	 frame	enframing	 ‘re-
ality’	 itself”	 (Žižek	2004:	29).	This	 “gap	between	 reality	and	appearance”,	
Žižek	argues,	means	that	reality	appears	to	be	itself,	with	a	minimal	gap,	a	
“minimal	difference”	(Žižek	2004:	29).	This	“always-already	redoubling”	is	
demonstrated	perfectly	in	Gertrude	Stein’s	modernist	classic	The Autobiog­
raphy of Alice B. Toklas.	Alfy	Maurer,	“an	old	habitué	of	the	house”,	defends	
Cézanne’s	paintings:
“Of	course	you	can	tell	it	is	a	finished	picture,	he	used	to	explain	to	other	American	painters	who	
came	and	looked	dubiously,	you	can	tell	because	it	has	a	frame,	now	whoever	heard	of	anybody	
framing	a	canvas	if	the	picture	isn’t	finished?”	(Stein	2014:	10)
Here	Stein	–	or	her	narrator	Toklas	–	or	the	collector	Maurer	–	implicitly	con-
nects	the	physical	frame	of	the	painting	with	the	institutional	framing	of	art	
itself	(a	contested	struggle	within	the	book,	with	its	situating	of	Stein’s	salon	
versus	the	great	modernist	upheavals	then	ongoing	in	Paris).
Let’s	return	to	our	iPhone	example.	There	is	the	visual	frame	that	is	the	way	
in	which	the	interface	(of	the	operating	system,	with	its	passcodes,	icons	and	
comment	 fields)	 is	 structured.	And	 then	 there	 is	 the	physical,	or	haptic,	or	
thing-ness,	frame	of	the	digital	device	itself,	the	“handheld	device”,	which	we	
touch	and	carry	around	and	occasionally	plug	in	to	recharge,	or	to	connect	“to	
the	Internet”.	And	these	constitute,	qua redoubled	frame,	an	Event,	a	frame	or	
fantasy	of	our	perception,	of	our	desire,	of	how	we	see	and	act	upon	the	world.	
But	–	 then	–	 it	 is	 the	gap between	these	frames,	between	the	virtual	frame	
and	the	physical	frame,	where	the	Event	actually	occurs.	For	this	is	where,	as	
Flisfeder	so	perspicuously	puts	it,	we	emerge	as	subjects.	And,	as	we	will	find	
out	later	in	our	reading	of	Žižek’s	Event:
“…	the	true	Event	is	the	Event	of	subjectivity	itself	(…)	the	status	of	subjectivity	itself	is	even-
tual.”	(Žižek	2014a:	67)
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In	a	similar	fashion,	Scott	McCloud	has	argued	that	comics	are	an	“invisible	
art”,	that	the	interpretive	actions	of	readers	take	place	“in	the	gutter”	or	be-
tween	the	panels	(frames)	of	the	graphic	narrative	(McCloud 1993).	Johanna	
Drucker	has	most	productively	connected	 that	 specific	 site	of	 the	 frame	 to	
the	digital	interface.	Arguing	that	“we	have	moved	from	a	traditional	discus-
sion	of	graphical	formats	as	elements	of	mise en page	to	a	sense	that	we	are	
involved	with	a	mise en scene or système”	(Drucker	2011:	7).	She	nonetheless	
steers	clear	of	what	Alex	Galloway	identifies,	in	his	discussion	of	The Inter­
face Effect,	as	the	sense	of	“windows,	screens,	keyboards,	kiosks,	channels,	
sockets,	and	holes”	as	threshholds	(Galloway	2012).
Here	again	we	see	the	same	doubled	frames	–	the	frame	of	the	virtual,	the	in-
terface	as	software	and	images	and	icons	(McCloud,	Drucker),	and	the	frame	
as,	in	the	second	half	of	Galloway’s	list,	the	holes	and	plugs	and	objects	that	
enable	or	hold	those	virtual	frames.	Thus	Drucker	is	surely	correct	to	critique	
how	interface	studies	has	been	“substituting	the	idea	of	a	‘user’	for	that	of	a	
‘subject’”	(Drucker	2011:	1),	echoing	Jodi	Dean’s	assertion	that	“the	matter	
of	the	Internet	has	less	to	do	with	bits,	screens,	code,	protocol,	and	fiber-optic	
cable	than	it	does	with	people”	(Dean	2014).	These	lists,	however,	in	Gallo-
way	and	Dean	(windows,	screens,	keyboards,	kiosks,	channels,	sockets,	holes,	
bits,	screens,	code,	protocol)	are	symptomatic	of	what	is	in	Object-Oriented	
Ontology	called	the	“Latour	Litany”,	or	the	list	of	objects	which	intends	to	
demonstrate	some	hitherto	unanticipated	partition	or	barrier	that	is,	presum-
ably,	 independent	of	 subjectivity	 (Bogost	2012).	For	example,	 later	 in	The 
Interface Effect, Galloway	argues	that,	as	the	society	of	control	replaces	the	
society	of	spectacle,	and	the	lens	replaces	the	mirror	(or,	in	his	more	ornate	
vocabulary,	the	dioptric	replaces	the	catoptric),	the	very	invisibility	and	trans-
parent	operability	of	the	interface	is	its	own	worst	enemy:	“frames,	windows,	
doors,	and	other	thresholds	are	those	transparent	devices	that	achieve	more	
the	less	they	do”	(Galloway	2012:	25).	This	sounds	not	a	little	Orwellian,	both	
in	terms	of	its	ominousness	and	in	the	call,	in	George	Orwell’s	classic	essay	
“The	Politics	of	the	English	Language”	for	prose	as	clear	as	a	windowpane	
(even	if	Galloway	is	being	descriptive	rather	than	prescriptive).	Which	is	not	
to	 say	 that	Galloway	 is	not	 correct,	but	perhaps	 that	 it	 is	worth	 looking	at	
those	fails	of	the	systems,	those	gaps	between	the	frames,	rather	than	focusing	
on	the	big	Other	of	an	over-arching	system	of	control.
Žižek	accepts	the	frame’s	“inconsistency”,	its	“meaningless	and	impenetra-
ble	presence”	of	“over-identification”	with	the	frame.	These	concepts	can	be	
compared	with,	on	 the	one	hand,	 the	variety	of	ways	 in	which	we	are	 told	
to	deal	with	social	media	today	(from	cleanses	and	fasts	to	non-commercial	
alternative),	 and,	 in	 a	more	 technological	way,	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 responses	
discussed	by	Galloway	in	his	book	Protocol: How Control Exists after De­
centralization.	Galloway	contrasts	two	kinds	of	resistance:	on	the	one	hand,	
the	total	withdrawal	exemplified	in	the	“Unabomber”	(Theodore	Kaczynski),	
and	on	the	other	hand,	attempts	to	“refuse	protocol	(…)	to	direct	these	proto-
cological	technologies	(…)	toward	what	Hans	Magnus	Enzensberger	calls	an	
‘emancipated	media’	created	by	active	social	actors	rather	than	passive	users”	
(Galloway	2001:	16).
And	so	Žižek	also,	in	Event,	in	his	discussion	of	framing,	enframing,	refram-
ing,	connects	the	frame	as	Event	to	the	frame	as	fantasy.	Does	this	mean	that	
fantasy	is	an	Event?	And	what	does	Žižek	mean	by	saying	that	we	need	to	
overcome	this	enframing,	we	need	to	“traverse	the	fantasy”	of	technology?	
These	are	two	sets	of	questions	–	what	is	fantasy,	and	what	does	it	mean	to	
traverse	 it?	First	of	 all,	 then,	 in	 the	Lacanian-Žižekian	 tradition,	 fantasy	 is	
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not	merely	an	illusion,	or	a	daydream,	rather,	it	is	more	fundamental	to	our	
everyday	life.	Fantasy	both	structures	our	reality,	our	identity	(I	am	a	woman	
or	a	man	of	a	certain	age	and	profession,	I	have	certain	hobbies	or	books	that	
I	have	read	or	political	activities	 that	 I	have	undertaken,	 I	 live	 in	a	certain	
country	 and	have	 an	 intimate	partner,	 a	 child,	 and	 so	on)	and it	 structures	
our	desire.	And	these	things	are	connected:	as	a	university	professor,	I	have	
certain	desires	(how	I	teach	and	do	research,	for	promotion	or	for	effect	 in	
my	community).	And	the	fantasy	that	structures	my	desire,	that	teaches	me	
what	or	how	to	desire,	then	is	centered	on	an	objet petit a: the	object	of	my	
desire,	this	“little	bit	of	the	Real”,	that	which	is	“in	you	more	than	you”.	The	
Lacanian	formula	or	matheme	for	desire	is	$<>a. That	is,	I	am	constituted	as	
a	subject	(as	a	barred	subject,	a	divided	or	split	subject,	hence	$)	in	relation	
to	(the	 lozenge	or	<>	denoting	moving	 to	and	away	from,	or	even	circling	
around…)	the	objet petit a.
Žižek	connects	the	question	of	the	“frame”	and	the	objet petit a in	a	slightly	
earlier	discussion	of	the	Hollywood	“production	of	the	couple”	(Žižek	2012).	
One	feature	of	the	objet petit a,	he	says	there,	is	that	it	designates	what	is	tak-
en	from,	or	subtracted,	from	reality	(he	is	riffing	off	of	Badiou	here	as	well)	
–	and	reality	gains	its	consistence	precisely	from	this	subtraction,	this	loss.	
That	is,	here	Žižek’s	perspicuous	program	is	quite	clear:	we	do	not	traverse	
the	fantasy,	we	do	not	overcome	the	enframing	by	“transcending”	it,	by	going	
on	a	Facebook	cleanse	or	requiring,	like	the	proverbial	millionaire	at	his	wed-
ding,	that	everyone	leave	their	smartphones	outside:
“…	while	it	may	seem	obvious	that	psychoanalysis	should	liberate	us	from	the	hold	of	idiosyn-
cratic	fantasies	and	enable	us	to	confront	reality	the	way	it	is,	this	is	precisely	what	Lacan	does	
not have	in	mind:	traversing	the	fantasy	does	not	mean	simply	going	outside	the	fantasy,	but	
shattering	its	foundations,	accepting	its	inconsistency.”	(Žižek	2014a)
Rather:
“The	way	to	break	out	of	the	Hollywood	frame	is	thus	not	to	treat	the	Thing	as	just	a	metaphor	of	
family	tension,	but	to	accept	it	in	its	meaningless	and	impenetrable	presence.”	(Žižek	2014a)
And,	finally:
“The	ideologico-political	dimension	of	this	notion	of	‘traversing	the	fantasy’	was	made	clear	
by	the	unique	role	the	rock	group	Top lista nadrealista (The Top List of the Surrealists) played	
during	the	Bosnian	war	(…)	they	daringly	mobilized	all	the	clichés	about	‘stupid	Bosnians’.”	
(Žižek	2012)
Rejecting	or	claiming	to	have	eluded	the	frame	in	which	social	media	or	digital	
devices	operate	(which	is	to	say	the	double	frame,	the	virtual	and	the	material	
frames)	–	would	only	be	delusional,	for	two	reasons.	First,	as	argued	above,	
such	a	move	only	results	in	another	frame	(hence	the	commonplace	fetishes	
today	of	the	artisanal,	the	handmade	or	DIY,	the	organic	or	local),	another	ob­
jet petit a – and	the	structure	of	fantasy	would	remain	intact.	Secondly	–	and	
this	is	a	broader	claim	of	Žižek’s	–	the	frame	requires	precisely	this	fantasy	of	
not	believing.	Again	this	argument	breaks	down	into	two:	first,	the	longstand-
ing	claim	of	Žižek	that	ideology	requires	a	minimal	distance	or	cynical	disa-
vowal	(as	in	Flisfeder’s	argument	with	respect	to	Žižek	and	the	two	frames	in	
Fright of Real Tears).	That	is,	our	very	“passionate	(dis)attachment”	allows	
us	to	enjoy	our	devices	and	apps	even	as	we	misrecognize	the	very	conditions	
for	that	enjoyment.
Third	and	finally,	that	very	“minimal	distance”,	or	the	difference	between	the	
two	frames,	is	where	our	gap	or	lack	as	subjects	is	founded.	Think	of	when	
you	purchase	a	new	phone	or	tablet	or	computer.	For	a	time,	it	is	exciting	–	a	
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new	fetish	object	 to	slip	 into	your	pocket	or	casually	open	on	a	café	 table,	
hook	up	to	a	projector	in	the	lecture	hall,	etc.	But	once	all	of	your	apps	and	
programs	and	music	and	files	have	been	restored	from	the	cloud	–	isn’t	it	now	
boring?	Old	wine	in	new	bottles,	etc.	Or,	you	find	a	great	new	app	–	one	that	
allows	you	to	find	a	rental	car,	or	get	a	hot	new	date,	or	 listen	to	the	BBC	
anywhere. Again,	excitement,	fetishization	for	a	while,	and	then	–	well,	still	
got	“the	crap	phone”,	don’t	you?	The	chipped	edge	or	that	crack	your	thumb	
keeps	getting	caught	on	 (surely	 the	cracked	 iPhone	 is	 the	ultimate	“fragile	
absolute”),	the	duct	tape	peeling	off	where	you	stuck	it	over	the	Apple	logo	
on	your	laptop	–	they	haven’t	changed.
Thus,	what	to	do?	Instead	of	this	acting out,	one	can	traverse	the	fantasy	of	
the	digital	by	accepting	its	“inconsistency”,	its	“meaningless	and	impenetrable	
presence”,	which	is	to	say,	as	Žižek	has	argued	for	twenty	years,	to	engage	in	the	
“over-identification”	with	ideology	(with	fantasy,	with	the	frame),	as	he	calls	
for	in	The Plague of Fantasies, referring	to	Jaroslav	Hašek’s	The Good Soldier 
Schweik, “whose	hero	wreaks	total	havoc	by	simply	executing	the	orders	of	his	
superiors	in	an	overzealous	and	all-too-literal	way”	(Žižek	1997:	29).	Simply	
put,	this	is	because	we	only	think	we	are	rejecting	a	given	frame	or	fantasy	(or,	
to	use	a	more	Marxist	term,	ideology).	And	yet,	that	frame	still	does	its	work	on	
us.	Of	course	this	does	not	mean	that	we	must	put	up	with	irrational	laws.	Quite	
the	contrary.	As	Mladen	Dolar	argues,	the	admission	in	advance	of	a	law’s	un-
foundedness	entails	a	kind	of	degradation	of	the	law	(Dolar	1991).	It	deprives	
the	law	of	its	internal	authority	and	clears	a	place	for	“real”	authority	to	be	es-
tablished:	the	authority	of	reason	and	truth.	In	the	degradation	of	the	inner	rea-
soning	and	authority	of	technology	we	could	free	ourselves	from	the	slavery	of	
user-consumer	logic.	In	order	to	start	freeing	ourselves	of	unquestionable	laws	
and	rules,	of	visions	of	technology	as	a	commodity	and	consensus	of	the	global	
profit	orientation	of	capitalist	networks,	one	must	abandon	the	logic	of	natural	
technological	progress.	In	order	to	engage	in	a	critique	of	political	economy,	
one	must	abandon	the	religious	fetishistic	belief	in	techno-progress.
Conclusion: the right way, the wrong way (in reverse)
In	Žižek’s	work	we	find	the	exhortation	to	traverse	the	fantasy,	to	constitute	
a	 fidelity	 to	 the	Event,	 by	way	not	 of	 a	minimal	distance	 from	 the	 fantasy	
(which	is	the	founding	principle	of	transgression),	but	through	over-identifica-
tion	(Žižek	1997,	Žižek	2014a).	Two	examples	from	digital	culture	and	new	
media	should	make	this	precept	clear.	Copyright	infringement,	from	the	early	
21st	century	examples	of	filesharing	and	P2P	platforms	(from	Gnutella	to	Nap-
ster)	to	contemporary	bit-torrenting	and	Pirate	Bay	constitute	the	extension	of	
the	pleasure	principle	(now	a	hegemonic	ideology	of	late	capitalism).	Through	
a	minimal	 distance	 from	 the	master	 Signifier	 of	 capital,	 the	 downloader	 is	
able	to	ensure	herself	that	they	are	striking	a	blow	for	freedom,	whereas,	simi-
lar	to	home	tapers	in	the	1980s,	one	is	merely	substituting	one	technological	
consumption	 (the	 purchase	 of	 bandwidth,	 hardware,	 and	Wi-Fi	 signals)	 for	
another	(films,	CD’s,	MP3’s)	(Sterne	2012).	A	strikingly	different	example	of	
such	negation	can	be	seen	in	the	work	of	such	activists	as	Julian	Assange,	Ed-
ward	Snowden,	and	Aaron	Swartz.	In	all	of	these	cases,	arguably	an	over-iden-
tification	with	the	“information	wants	to	be	free”	precept	of	digital	hegemony	
results	in	very	different	conditions	than	the	illegal	downloaders;	they	stand	as	
examples	of	the	“obscene	underside”	of	technology	(and	new	media)	today.	
Assange,	Snowden,	and	Swartz	show	very	clearly	that	traversing	the	fantasy	
of	new	media	does	not	entail	a	simple	abandonment	of	technology.	On	the	con-
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trary,	accepting	the	official	story	of	distribution	and	open	source	code,	means	
accepting	the	inconsistencies,	 the	symptomal torsions,	 that	constitute	digital	
hegemony	today.	Insisting	upon,	indeed	following	to	their	ends,	the	inconsist-
encies	of	new	media	qua Event.	And	it	is	in	following	Badiou	and	Žižek,	in	
arguing	that	a	concept	of	the	Event	contains	infinite	–	multiple	–	gestures	that	
are	immanent	to	itself.	Such	a	theory	of	the	Event	thus	inquires	thoroughly	into	
the	notion	of	the	frame	as	Event,	enframing	or	even	a	doubled	frame,	a	series	
of	frames	that	are	both	epistemological	(they	frame	the	world,	 like	Kantian	
faculties)	and	ontological	(the	world	does	not	exist	without	its	frames).	Fur-
thermore,	as	pointed	out	with	respect	to	new	media,	to	is	multiples	of	objects	
and	interfaces,	of	the	thing	and	the	virtual,	these	frames	are	both	constitutive	
of	the	Real	and	are	a	way	in	which	the	digital	constitutes	an	Event.
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Novi medij kao Događaj
Sažetak
Događaj je filozofski koncept koji proizlazi iz kontinentalne tradicije (Heidegger, Deleuze, Ba­
diou, Žižek), koristan za označavanje povijesne situacije u kojoj multiplicitet zadobiva kritičnu 
masu. Nakon praćenja genealogije koncepta u navedenih autora, argumentiramo da je ter­
min koristan za mišljenje raznih tehnika i praksi (računala, telekomputacija, pametni mobiteli, 
društveni mediji) koje se označava kao »novi medij«. Ova oznaka, nadalje, omogućuje nam 
razumjeti razliku između smislene kritike (političke geste poput one Aarona Swartza) i manje 
smislene kritike (bit­torrenting i drugi oblici piratstva na internetu).
Ključne riječi
događaj,	novi	medij,	autorska	prava,	okviri,	internet
Clint Burnham, Katarina Peović Vuković
Neues Medium als Ereignis
Zusammenfassung
Das „Ereignis“ ist ein philosophisches Konzept, das aus der kontinentalen Tradition (Heideg­
ger, Deleuze, Badiou, Žižek) hervorgeht und für die Kennzeichnung der historischen Situation 
nützlich ist, in welcher die Multiplizität eine kritische Masse erhält. Nachdem wir die Genea­
logie des Konzepts bei den vorgenannten Autoren verfolgt haben, argumentieren wir, dass sich 
dieser Terminus für das Nachdenken über unterschiedliche Techniken und Praxen (Computer, 
Telecomputation, Smartphones, soziale Medien), die man als „neues Medium“ bezeichnet, als 
brauchbar erweist. Fernerhin ermöglicht uns diese Bezeichnung, die Differenzierung zwischen 
einer sinnvollen Kritik (politische Gesten wie jene Aaron Swartz’) und einer weniger aussage­
kräftigen Kritik (BitTorrenting und andere Formen der Piraterie im Internet) zu begreifen.
Schlüsselwörter
Ereignis,	neues	Medium,	Urheberrechte,	Rahmen,	Internet
Clint Burnham, Katarina Peović Vuković
Nouveau média en tant qu’Événement
Résumé
« L’Événement » est un concept philosophique qui découle de la tradition continentale (Hei­
degger, Deleuze, Badiou, Žižek) et qui est utile pour exprimer la situation historique dans la­
quelle la multiplicité prend la forme d’une masse critique. Après avoir observé la généalogie 
du concept chez les auteurs mentionnés, nous argumentons en vue de montrer que le terme est 
utile pour penser diverses techniques et pratiques (ordinateurs, télécomputation, smartphones, 
médias sociaux), que nous désignons de « nouveaux médias ». Cette qualification, par la suite, 
nous permet de comprendre la différence entre une critique sensée (le geste politique à l’instar 
de celui d’Aaron Swartz) et les critiques moins sensées (le bit­torrent ou d’autres formes de 
piratages sur internet).
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